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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Equilibriums to simple games, such as majori ty rule , in 
multidimensional spaces require such severe symme try of  pre ferences 
as to rarely exis t . 1 Consequently , social processes  may usually be in
disequilibrium. The way they shift the state o f  the world through 
time can o�ly be understood when an explici t dynamic mechanism or 
institution allows sequences of  social decisions to be examined . 
To date , se quential simple games have been investigated 
in the context of two "disequilibrium" hypotheses regarding the 
interconnection be tween outcomes . Cohen [1977], McKelvey [1976] , 
[1977] and Schofield [1977a] essen tially assume that an outcome in 
one period can be any al ternative preferred to the previous outcome 
by a winning coalition . They show that sequences of outcomes required 
to satisfy only this dominance property do not satisfy any regularity 
condition , since such a sequence connects  almost any two alternatives 
in the social choice space . Kramer [19 75], in the majority rule con-
text , strengthens their assumption to requiring that an outcome re-
ceive a maximal number of votes against  the previous outcome. He finds 
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that these "maximally dominating" sequences always enter the minimax 
set [Simpson, 1969] when each voter has Euclidean preferences , that  
is , u tility that decreases with the Euclidean distance from an  ideal 
point. This convergence is a regularity property that may provide 
insight into political situations where mobile challengers oppose 
fixed incumbents. 
In this paper a different hypothesis relating sequential 
social outcomes is advanced , motivated by the supposition that social
change is not instantaneous. More specifi cally , in any time period
only alternatives a small distance from the previous outcome are 
assumed to be feasible . Taken to i ts logical and mathematically 
tractab le extreme , this assumption converts the prob lem into one 
involving a continuum of social decisions , each of which determines
a direction in which to marginally shift the �urre�t status quo.2
Since social decisions in this setting are directions, 
the application of cooperative game theory requires that  directional 
preferences be determined from the location of the status quo and 
the underlying preferences over social states . Directions are 
represented  as vec tors of zero or uni t  length , and in section 2 one 
direction is said to be preferred  to another if it  is nearer one's 
utility gradient evaluated a t  the status quo . The set of winning 
coal.itions is then used to define a dominance relation on direc tions , 
and undominated directions are predicted outcomes to the game. In 
o ther words , the status quo is predic ted to shift in a direction to
which no winning coalition unanimously prefers another direction of 
shift. 
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The distinction between the undominated direction hypothesis 
and the hypothesis that each chosen point dominates the preceeding one 
should be emphasized. The continuous version of the latter requires 
the shift direction to dominate only the zero direction that corres­
ponds to a null shift. The undominated hypothesis, on the other hand , 
requires the shift direction to be undominated in the set of all 
directions . Neither hypothesis implies the o ther , as can be seen in 
the examples of section 2. 
In Appendix A ,  which supplements section 2, an alternative 
directional core is defined via an inducement of directional preferences 
that is independent of utili ty gradients. This core is found to be 
contained in the one defined in section 2. The two are identical if 
each utility function satisfies a condition we label local symmetry. 
For comparati\'e purposes , the local point core so often 
studied since Plott [1967] is examined in section 3. As it too is
defined via u tility gradients , a second definition involving small 
neighborhoods is explored in Appendix B. The relationship between 
the two local point cores is found to be strictly analogous to that 
between the two directional cores uncovered in Appendix A. Further­
more , the first point core and sometimes the second can be defined in 
terms of the analogous directional cores. Specifically ,  it  is shown 
that a point is locally undominated if and only if the zero direction 
corresponding to a null shift  is undominated . This result is 
strengthened in section 3 when its point core is shown to consist of
points whose directional cores contain all directions . Finally ; 
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section 3 concludes with the demonstration that in the benchmark 
case of Euclidean pre ferences, directions that "point" to an 
existing point core are undominated . 
Before dynamics are discussed , an important tangent is 
pursued in section 4. The directional core is found to  be equiva­
lent to the cone whose nonexistence is shown by Schofield [1977a] 
to imp ly local cycling. Hence the nonexistence of an undominated 
direction implies that any two points sufficiently close to the
status quo can be connected by a finite sequence of points , each of
which dominates the preceeding one. 
In section 5 an investigation is begun of the paths gen­
erated when the status quo is infinitesimally shif ted in undominated 
"directions. A status quo so shifted through a p oint x is shown, at 
the time i t  is at x ,  to be simultaneously approaching every point 
in every winning coalition's preferred-to-x set .  No path satisfying 
this " approach" property exists through points with emp ty directional 
cores . Thus a point with an empty directional core satisfies a solu­
tion-like property in not being able to shift  so as to approach simul­
taneously every point preferred to  itself by every winning coalition . 
In section 6 it  is shown that if  preferences are Euclidean ,  
and if  the speed of  the status quo is bounded below when it  follows 
undominated directions (which it  does whenever they exist, by assump­
tion) , then the status quo either enters the set of  points with empty
directional cores or converges to the point core. This convergence 
resul t  in the simplest of situations concludes the paper , excep t for
a discussion in section 7 of the principal shortcoming of the direc­
tional core as a solution concept :  its frequent non-existence . 
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2. THE DIRECTIONAL CORE 
The set of possible social states in this paper is simply 
a Euclidean space E
m. The societal status quo can therefore be 
represented at any time by a point x E Em. This section 
describes the static game that is played at each point in time and 
whose outcomes are shifts in the status quo. 
The magnitude of feasible shifts is assumed to be very 
small (infinitesmal) and independent of their direction. Hence an 
outcome may be represented by the direc t ion in which x shifts, where
a direction is formally defined to be a vector in E
m of unit or 
zero length. All directions of shift are allowed, so the set of 
feasible outcomes is B = B u {O}, where B is the ball consisting 
of all unit vectors. 
The players of the game are represented by an index set 
N = {1,2, . . •  ,n}. The preference ordering of each player i e: N 
over social states is represented by a continuously differentiable 
utility function u.: Em+ R. From u., we induce a preference 1 1 
ordering Pi(x) on B by defining, for any v1,v2 E B, 
(2. 1) v1P i (x)v2 {:}v1 • 'Vui 
(x) > v2 • 'Vui (x). 
By this ordering on B ,  the preferred member of a pair of directions 
is the one closest to the utility gradient. In Appendix A we show 
""' that v1P1(x)v2 implies that player i prefers shifting x infinitesimaily 
in direction v1 rather than v2• 
Returning to the game, its outcome (direction x shifts) shall 
be determined by the set W of winning coalitions that characterize a 
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simple game. Formally, W is a collection of subsets of N that is 
(2. 2i) 
(2.2ii) 
(2. 2iii) 
(non- trivial) 
(superadditive) 
(proper) 
(ii i W, N e: W 
M e: W, M c M� =} M� e: W 
M E W=}Mc i W. 
Sometimes we shall assume the game is also strong: 
(2.2iv) (strong) M. E W#Mc f/_ W.
Majority rule games,. where any coalition containing more than n/2 
members is declared winning, are the most common simple games satis-
fying (2. 2i-iii). A majority rule game is strong provided n is odd. 
Now the usual solution concept for a cooperative game, 
the core, can be defined. First define a dominance relation 
on B by v1D(x)v2 provided there exists a winning coalition M e: W such
that v1Pi(x)v2 for all i E M. Then the directional core K(x) is the 
set of all undominated directions: 
(2.3) K(x) = {V e: B I Jf v E B 3 vD(x)�}. 
If it is nonempty, the outcome shift is assumed to be in K(x), which 
is particularly plausible because K(x) is shown in Appendix A to 
contain the core defined there independently of utility gradients. 
The nature of the directional core is clarified by the 
following fundamental characterization. Its statement requires, 
for any v E S and x E Em, a coalition to be defined by 
(2. 4) M(x,v) ={i e: N I v • 'Vu.(x) > O}. 1 
M(x,v) is simply the coalition that prefers the status quo to shift 
in direction v to remaining at x, that is, the set of people that 
prefers (by Pi(x)) v to O. 
Proposition 2.1: For any x c En, 
(2. 5) K(x) = {� E: B I Vv E: B 3 v • v < 0, M(x,v) rt W}. 
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Proof: Suppose v E: B and that for all v c B satisfying v • v _::: 0, 
M(x, v) rt W. If v rt K(x), then there exists v' c B and an ME: W such 
that v'P.(x)� for all i c M. 
l 
Hence for each i c M, (v' - -;;) • Vu.(x) > 0.l 
Since v' - v f 0, we can let v 
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, 
v • v = 
v "v- v•v 
II v' - �I I  
v - v 
11 v' - v 
< o. 
Clearly v c B, ,a:nd by
So by the hypothesis, M(x,v) i W. But for any i c M, v • Vui(x) > 0 
since (v' - �) • Vu.(x) > 0. Hence M c M(x,v) , and by superadditivity,1 
we achieve the contradiction M(x,v) c W. Thus� s K(x). 
Conversely, suppose-;; E: K(x). If v = 0, then for any vs B ,
vP.(x)-; for all i E: M (x,v). Because v l 0 is undominated, M(x, v) rt W 
for all v E: B.  Also, M(x, O) 0 i W. Hence we need to show
M(x, v) i W only for� 1 0, v 1 0, and v • v < 0. 
For any i E: N, v • Vui(x) can be considered as a continuous 
function of v on B. So if v • Vui(x) > 0, there is an open neigfibor­
hood U.(v) of v such that y • \7u.(x) > 0 for all y E: U.(,,;). Hence l 1 1 
for any v E: B and any 
y E: ('\ U, (v)l icll(x, v) 
U(v), 
M(x, v) c M(x, y). By ·superadditivity, M(x,y) rt W implies M(x, v) rt (JJ. 
If v • v < 0 ,  furthermore, since U(v) is an open neighborhood of v, 
there is a y E: U(v) such that y • v < 0. Therefore, to show that 
v • v _.'.:: 0 implies M(x, v) rt W, we need only show that v • v < 0 implies 
M(x,v) rt W. 
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So suppose v v < O. Let v' = v - 2(v • v)v. Then v' E: B.
If i c M(x, v), then v • Vu.(x) > 0, and so (v' - �) · • Vu.(x) = 
l l 
-2( v • �)(v • Vu.(x)) > 0. Hence v'P.(x)� for all i E: M(x, v), 
l l 
implying that M(x, v) rt W since� is undominated.
The content of proposition 2.1 is easily interpretable. Say 
that a direction v "points away" from another direction v provided 
v • v < 0. Then (2.5) implies a direction v is undominated provided 
no winning coalition prefers a direction pointing away from v 
over the null direction. Stated differently, if the coalition 
M(x, v) preferring x to shift in direction v is winning, then no 
direction v pointing away from v is undominated. 
(2.6) 
and 
(2. 7) 
For future reference, let 
. I = {x c Em 
L = {x c Em 
K(x) f 0 }, 
K(x) = 0 }= Ic 
In Appendix A, I is shown to be closed, so that 'f< is open. Let
J = interior I and L = closure L. 
Examples of undominated directions are easily constructed 
that utilize the benchmark Euclidean preferences so pervasive in the 
spatial model literature. A person i E: N is said .to have Euclidean 
preferences if there is a point p. E: Em such that 
l 
(2.8) 
2 
u.(x) =- I I p. - x II 1 1 
represents them. The point pi is i's ideal point, and his indifference 
surfaces are spheres centered at pi. At any point x, the gradient
Vu
i
(x) = 2(pi - x) is a vector "pointing ... from x to p1• 
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When preferences are Euclidean and the game is majority 
rule, expression (2 .5) simply says that v £ K(x) if any hyperplane 
containing x has no more than half the ideal points on any open 
side of it not containing v. Thus when n is odd, as in figure� 
2.la, b, d, an undominated direction at x is unique and must point
towards a p
i 
satisfying the median-like property that any ·hyper­
plane containing pi and x bisects the whole set of ideal points. 
In figure 2,lb the cone T1 contains the directions that all 
three people prefer to a null shift at x1, but the undominated 
direction �1¢ T1. At x2 in figure 2.lb and at x in figure 2 .lc , no
winning coalition prefers the undominated direction shown to the zero 
direction, that is, no winning coalition is better off if those status 
quos shift in the undominated directions indicated . In figure 2.ld, 
m = 3 and x is floating above the two-dimensional traingle p1p2p3. 
Everybody would prefer x to shift in a direction such. as t, but never-
'theless there is no undominated direction.
3 .  THE POINT CORE 
In this section, to further clarify the nature of the 
directional core K(x), it is contrasted to a local point core often 
considered in the literature. To this end, define K c E
m to be the 
set of points x for which there is no direction v £ B and coalitio·n 
M £ W such that y • Vu
i
(x) > 0 for all i £ M.
tion, this point core is simply 
(3.1) K = {x £ Em J \;j v £ B, M (x,v) i W}. 
In the previous nota-
J 
x �
v 
P4 
(a) m = 2, n 5 
J = Em 
/I 
/' 
x
�',J 
T 
... .... .... 
p 3 
-
(c) m 2, n 4 
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Although, as is shown in Appendix B, K is only a linear approxima-' 
tion to the set of locally undominated points, it has been discussed 
widely under various guises: it is the "local core" to the dynamic 
game of Schofield [1977b], the set of "Plott equilibriums" in Sloss
[1973], and, in the context of majority rule, the set of "quasi-. 
undominated'" points in Matthews [1977], of "total med ians" in Hoyer 
and Mayer [1975], and of "equilibriums" j_n Plott [1967]. 
The definition of K can also be written 
(3.2) K = {x E Em I 0 E K(x)}, 
which says that x is in the point cor e provided no direction in B 
dominates the zero direction. This is in contrast to the condition 
implied by (2. 5) for the directional core K(x) to be non-empty, 
namely, that only some closed half of B not dominate the zero direc-
tion. In this sense the existence conditions for K(x) are weaker than 
those for K. This is further indicated by the following corollary 
to proposition 1, which indicates x E K if and only if every direction 
is undominated at x. 
Corollary 3.1: Expression (3.2) can be strengt�ened to
(3. 3) K = {x E Em I K(x) B}. 
Proof: By (3.2) we need only show that KC {x E Em I K(x) = B}. 
Suppose x E K and v t: B. By (3.1), N(x,v) t [V for all v E B. 
Hence by (2.5), v E K(x). This proves K(x) B.
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There is a closer relationship between the cores K and K(x) 
in the case of Euclidean preferences. The following proposition 
states that in this �ase any direction pointing from x to K is 
contained in the directional core K(x)-- a result clearly having 
content only when K 1 0. 
Proposition 3.1: Let x E Em. If preferences are Euclidean, then· 
(3.4) {v E B I 3 A > o =i x + Av E K} c K(x). . -
Proof: It must be shown that if z EK, then K(x) contains the v EB 
for which z = x + Av for some A .:>: 0. Suppose v E B satisfies
v v < O. Then v • (z - x) _:5 O. Since Vu. (x)1 2 (pi - x), 
v • (pi - x) > 0 for all i E M(x, v). So for all i E M(x, v), 
v (pi - z) v • (pi - x) - v • (z-x) > 0. This proves that 
M(x,v) c M(z, v). Since M(z, v) t W because z EK, superadditivity
implies M (x, v) i W. Thus by proposition 2.1, v E K(x). 
The reverse of inclusion (3.4) is not always true, as 
figure 3.1 indicates. In this figure, N {1,2,3,4} and three-
and four-person coalitions are winning. At the point x, K(x) 
contains all directions between the directions that point to p2 
and p3, but only p3 is contained in K. The reason that all directions 
in K(x) in this example do not point to K is that the number of players 
in this majority rule game is even, which means that the game is not 
strong. The next proposition states that in strong simple games where 
preferences are Euclidean and K f 0, K(x) is exactly the set of direc-
tions that point to K. 
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Figure 3.1 
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Proposition 3.2: If  pre ferences a re Euclidean, the game is strong , 
and K # 0,· then
(3.5) K (x) = {-; E: 6 I x + Av E: K for some /.. > O}.
Proof : In view of proposition 3.1, i t is only necessary t0 show that
K(x) is contained in the set on the right o f  (3.5). So let vs B, ,
and suppose x + /,,-; i K for all/,,_'.:_ O. We must  show vi K(x) . We
can assume -; # 0, for-; = 0 and xi K imply-;¢ K (x ) .  In  Appendix
B i t  is shown that  K is closed , and a simple argument shows it is
convex and bounded when pre ferences are Euclidean . Since {x + /..v
/.. _'.:_. O} is disj o int from K ,  a separa t ing hyperplane theorem shows the·
existence of  v E: B such that  v • v < 0 and v • ( z  - x) > 0 for any
z E: K. Le t M = {i s N I v • (p. - x) < O}, and le t z s K. Then i fl. -
i E: M, - v • (pi - z )  = v • ( z - x )  - v • ( pi - x )  > 0. So , as z s K, 
MC M( z ,-v) ¢ W. Superadditivity now implies M ¢ W. Since the game
is s trong  and M(x,v) is the complement o f  M ,  M(x , v) E: W. So by
propositi.on 2.1, v ¢ K(x). 
4. LOCAL CYCLES AND DIRECTIONAL CORES 
A brief digress ion i s  now pursued in order to point out 
a connection be tween K (x )  and an important .cone s tudied by Scho-
field [1977a]. A second characterizat ion of K(x) is provided
tha t allows an immediate application o f  S chofield's Null Dual Theorem 
to show that K (x)  = � implies  the dominance re lation over points  is
cyclic in a neighborhood o f  x. S tated differently ,  a sufficient 
condition for· K(x) to be nonempty is that local cycling not occur 
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in the vi cinity o f  x. More notation is unfortunately. necessary. 
The (local2_ Pareto  optimal set for a coal ition MC N is
(4.1) P(M) = {x E Em Jj v EB =i Mc M(x,v)} , 
that is, x is (lo cally) Pareto optimal for M if  there i s  no direc-
tion in which everyone in M wants x to shift. Notice that K = nP(M). 
MEW 
The preference co-cone of a coalition MC N at a point x is simply
the convex cone generated by the ut ility gradients of those in M: 
(4.2) D(x,M) = {y E Em I y = Z :\ . 17u . (x)' , all:\. > 0, some:\. > O}, 
iEM i i i - i 
As Schofield [197 7a] demonstrates, 0 E D(x,M) if and only if
x E P(M). Define a related cone by 
(4. 3) B if x E p (M) 
D(x,M) 
D(x,M) n B if x i P (M).
Thus 0 E D(x ,M) , D(x,M) = B, and x E P(M) are all equivalent 
statements. The next: proposition provides an important characteri-
zation o f  the directional core K(x)  in terms of these cones. 
Proposition lf,l : A t  any x E Em, 
(4.4) K(x) = n D(x,M).
MEW 
Proo f :  K(x) c n D(x,M) is first  shown. Suppo se v E K(x). Then we 
ME:W 
must show v E D(x,M) whenever M is  winning, which is nontrivial 
only when D(x,M) I B. In this case the closed convex cone D(x,M)
does not contain O. Assume -:;;: i D(x,M). Then D(x,M) and v may be 
strictly separated with a hyperplane containing the origin, that 
is, there exists v E B such that v • v < 0 and v • y > 0 for all 
y E D(x,M). As 17ui(x) e D(x,M) for a ll i E M, the latter inequality 
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implies that MC M(x, v). Superadditivity then implies M(x, v) E W, 
which by proposition 2.1 contradicts v E K(x). Therefore v E D(x ,M;) 11 B
D(x,M), 
Now suppose v E n D(x,M). 
MEW 
We must show v E K(x).
Suppose v E B satisfies v "  v < 0. For any i E M(x,v), v • Vu. (x) > O, - ]_ 
which implies that v • y > 0 for all y E D(x, M(x , v)) . Hence 
{0,-:;;:} c;tD(x,M(x,v)). If M(x,v) E W, then by hypothesis, v E D(x,M(x,v))
B n D(x,M(x,v)), a contradiction. Hence M(x,v) i w. So by proposi-
tion 2.1, v E K(x). 
Proposition 4.1 allows the immediate co nclus ion ·that the emptiness 
of K(x) implies locaL cycling, once the latter is properly defined. 
Say that a point x1 is reachable from a point x0 provided there is 
a continuous path c: [O,l] + Em, differentiable on the intervals 
I1 = (O,t1), I2 
= (t1,t2), • • •  Ik 
= (tk_1,l), such that 
( 4. Si) 
(4. 5ii) 
(4.5iii) 
XO' c(O) 
c(l) x1, and 
M(I.) = n M(c (t) ,c�(t)) E W (j J tEI j
1, 2' .. . 'k).
So at each point t E I., there will be a winning coalition M(I.)J J 
that prefers the point c(t) to shift along the curve c rather than 
not shift at all : 
For any points y,z E Em, say that y dominates z if there 
exists MEW such that ui(y) > ui(z) for all i E M. Since 
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c�(t) • Vu.(c(t)) > 0 at each t E I. and i E M(I.), it is easy to 1 J J 
show that u . (c(t . +1)) > u. (c ( t. ) ) for every i E M (I . ) . Therefore, if 1 .) 1 J J 
x1 is reachable from x
0
, there is a sequence of k + 1 points x
0 
= 
c(O), c(t1), ... , c(tk_1), c(l) = x1 such that each point dominates 
the preceeding one. Thus if x0 
x1, this dominance relation is 
cyclic. Local _9'.cling is said to � � � provided there is a 
neighborhood U of x such that any poin t in U is reachable from x by 
a path that stays in U. 4 
The Null Dual Theorem of Schofield [1977a] states that 
local cycling occurs at x if n D(x,M) is empty. Proposition 4.1 
MEW 
therefore immediately implies 
Corollary 4. 1: Local cycling occurs at x if K ( x) 
5. THE APPROACH PROPERTY 
r/J. 
In this section an examination of dynamics is initiated 
by characterizing points with nonempty directional cores in terms 
of certain paths containing them. Specifically, the directiona� 
core at x is nonempty if and only if there is a path through x that 
possesses a type of optimality that will soon be defined. 
Because the global properties of paths are of interest, 
utility functions are often subsequently assumed to be 2seudo-
concave, that is, to satisfy for each i EN 
(5.1) (y - x) • Vui
(x) _:: 0 ==} u1(y) _:': ui(x). 
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The next proposition will also require the preferred-to-x set of 
a coalition MC N to be defined by 
(5. 2) P(x, M) = {y E Em / u.(y) > u.(x) for all i E M}. 
1 1 
The set P(x,M) is open and, if utility functions are p.seudoconcave, 
also convex. 
If A is either a set or point in E
m
, and c: [O,oo] + Em is 
a continuous, differentiable (almost everywhere) path, let the 
function g (•;A) : [0,oo] + R+ be the distance from c(t) to A: 
c 
(5. 3) g (t;A) = inf llY - c(tl ll · c yEA 
Denote by g�(t;Z) the derivative of gc at t. Say that the path c 
has the approach property at the point c(t) provided that for all 
M EW and y E P(c(t),M), 
(5.4) (Ct;y) < o. 
The approach property can be interpreted as a pointwise 
optimality condition on paths, since a path satisfying the approach 
property at x = c(t) is moving at time t simultaneously towards the 
preferred-to-x set of every winning coalition. One consequence 
of the following proposition is that a path satisfying the approach 
property at. a point x exists if and only if K(x) # r/J .
Proposition 5.1: Fix x E Em. If there is a path c having the approach 
property at x = c(t) , then 
(5.5) c� (t) 
11 c� c"t>ll 
s K(x) . 
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Conversely, if each u
i 
is pseudoconcave and c is a path satisfying 
c(t) = x and (5.5), then c satisfies the approach property at x. 
Proof: Suppose c has the approach property at x = c(t). Let 
v c> (t) 
11 c> Ct)!i 
Suppose v s B satisfies v • v < 0. By the continuity 
of each ui and the finiteness of M(x,v), there exists A > 0 such 
that u
i(x +Av) > ui(x) ·for all is M(x,v). Hence, letting y = 
x +Av, we have y s P(x ,M(x,v)). Since 
g>(t ;y) = - llc
>
(t)ll (v·�) > 0, c -
(5,·49 implies that M(x,v) ¢ (l), Proposition 2.1 now implies 
vs K(x), or rather, (5.5). 
Conversely, suppose c is a path satisfying c(t) = x and 
(5. 5), and assume utility ·functions are pseudoconcave. Let y s P(x, M) 
for some M s W. Then by pseudoconcavity, (y - x) .• Vui (x) > 0 for 
each i s M. Thus, by (S.S) and proposition 2.1, M s W implies 
(y - x) • c>(t) > 0. Hence c satisfies the approach property at x: 
g (t•y) = -c>(t) • (y x) 
c , 
< 0 
g
c 
(t;y) 
. 
Proposition 5.1 confers the optimal-like approach property 
to paths that always travel in undominated directions when such 
exist, as will be explicitly stated in the next section. Furthermore, 
proposition 5. 1 confers a solution property of sorts to the set L, 
since a point contained :ln L has an empty directional core and 
therefore cannot simultaneously approach every point preferred to 
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itself by every winning coalition.5 Therefore points in either K 
or 1 satisfy desirable properties; points x s K strongly because the 
preferred-to-x set of every winning coalition is empty, and 
points x s 1 weakly because they cannot simultaneously .approach all 
winning coalitions' preferred-to-x sets. 
Again, stronger results are obtainable if preferences are 
Euclidean. This section concludes with the following results that 
will be important for the convergence theorem of the next section. 
Lemma 5.1: Suppose preferences are Euclidean, and assume x i P(M) 
for some M c N .  Let z s P(M) satisfy 
l lz - x II 
Then z s P(x,M). 
inf 11 z - x II • 
Z.EP(M) 
Proof: It is well-known that P(M) is the convex hull of {p. J is M}. J. 
Hence z exists, since P(M) is closed. As P(M) is also convex, there 
is a supporting hyperplane at z with normal (z -x), that is, 
(5.6) (z - z) . (z - x) .::: 0
for all z s P(M). Since each p. s P(M), let z = p. in (5.6), 
J. J. 
substract x.· (z - x) from both sides, and rearrange to yield 
Hence 
<Pi - x) • cz -x) > <z -x> • c-z - x>.
2 
11 pi - x 1 1 - (p. -x>. <P. -x> J. J. 
> (p. -x> • (p. - x> - 2cp. - x>. cz -x> + cz-x>-<z-x>J. J. 2 J. 
11 <P. -x> - c-z - x)ll J. 2 
!IP. - z II . J. 
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As preferences are Euclidean, this proves u. ( z) > u. (x) for each ]_ l 
i E M, or rather, z E P(�,M) . 
Using this lemma, the following corollary proves that 
any path through x approaches each P(M) if and only if its tangent 
vector at x is contained in K(x). While this property does not
by itself have an optimal interpretat ion like the approach property, 
it will provide the cornerstone, of the next section's convergence 
result. 
Corollary 5. 1: Suppose preferences are Euclidean, and fix x E Em. 
If c is a pat h  differentiable at c(t) = x such t hat
(5.7) ��(t) 
11 c' <t)ll 
E K(x),
then for all MEW such that xi P(M) , 
(5.8) g �(t;P(M) ) < O. c 
Proof: Suppose ME [I} and xi P(M) . Dehne z(t) E P(M) by 
I I zCt) - cCt) I I inf I I z - c(t ) II 
zsP(M) 
= g
c
(t;P(M)) . 
Since c(t) is continuous and P(M) convex, z(t) is continuous. We 
first show¢ (t) = z(t ) • (z - x) is differentiable with ¢�(t) "' 0, 
where we have let z = z(t) . 
Because P(M) is convex, there is a supporting hyperplane 
at z(t) with normal z(t) - c(t) : 
(5.9) (z - z (t)) • (z(t) - c(t)) > 0 
for all z E P(M) . Hence 
and 
lim inf 
[(,(c) - ,,_. <' - �)] - .::. 0, 
t+t+ t - t 
lim sup l (z(t) - z)_· (z - x) J-t+t+ t - t 
• lim oop [(,(c) - ') ' ( ,(c) - c( ' ) )] · - < o. 
t+t+ t - t 
-
Hence the right hand derivative at t of ¢(t) , equal to 
lim 
t+t+ 
(z(t) - z) _
· (� - x)l 
t - t J 
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exists and is O. A similar argument establishes the same for the 
left hand derivative, so that ¢�(t) exists and ¢�(t) = 0. 
Since ¢'(t) and c�(t) exist, 
g�(t;P(M)) = 
d[(z(t) -c(t) ) • (z - x) J I c dt -t=t gc(t;P(M) )
-1
[¢�(t) - c'(t) 
·
� (� - x)J g ct; z)-l c 
also exists. As ¢'(t) = 0, 
(5 . 10) g� (t;P(M) ) - - - - - -1 - [c�(t) • (z - x) ) gc(t;z) 
g� (t;�). 
c 
But by lemma 5. 1, z E P(x,M) . Hence if (5. 7)  is true, proposition 5.1 
implies g�(t;z) < 0 since Euclidean utility functions are pseudo-c 
concave. Thus (5. 7 )  implies (5.8). 
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6. THE DYNAMIC PROCESS 
Now consider paths that the status quo tr aces if at each 
time its direction of shift is cont ained in the dire cti onal core 
whenever it is nonempty. The requirement that a directi on of 
movement be undominated whenever possible is a b ehavior al restriction. 
These paths are generated when the o ut co me of the simple game is an 
infintesimal shift of the status quo, after which a new game is 
played at the new status quo, and the entire process repeated inde-
finitely. One key assumption here is that p l ayers do not respond to 
realizations that current actions determine the location of future 
status quos and·hence which games will subsequently be played . 
Whether this "sincere" behavior is a result of myopia, moral injunc-
tions againsf: large-scale gaming, etc., it probably occurs in many 
situations. 
This dynamic process is modeled here as simply as possible. 
The ultimate goal is to obtain convergence of some sort to the set 
KU L that was argued previously to satisfy solution-like properties. 
However, for mathematical convenience, convergence to the closed 
set K \j L is investigated. The simplest assumption sufficient for·
convergence is merely that the speed of the status quo x is bounded 
below by s > 0 when x is not in KU L, that is, when x E J\K. An
upper bound S on the speed is also a convenient assumption. Finally, 
in order to minimally restrict the direction of motion, it is 
required to be undominated only when x E J'\K rather than when 
x € I. Summarizing, the status quo is assumed to follow a 
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path x: [O,ooJ + Em, differentiable almost every where, satisfying 
(6.1) x'(t) € F(x(t)), 
m 
where F: Em + 2E is a correspondence defined by 
€ Em ilYii_::s} if x E K U L 
F(x) = 
(6.2) {{y 
{y € E
m I s _:: i i Y i i _:: S and rr}n € K(x)} if x € J\K.
The correspondence F·maps points into truncated, convex closed cones, 
and is shown to be uppersemicontinuous in Appendix C. 
It now immediately follows that such a path almost always 
satisfies the approach property whenever possible. 
Corollary 6 .1: Provided all preferences are pseudoconcave_, a pa th x 
satisfying (6.1) and (6.2) has the approach property at all x( t) € J. 
Proof : If x(t) € J\K, then from (6.2), x � ( t) II x , ( t) 11 E K ( x) . Hence 
proposition 5.1 immediately implies that x satisfies the approach 
property at x(t). If x(t) E K, then the approach property is vacu-
ously satisfied at x(t) since P(x(t) ,M) = r/J for each M € W.
Two types of convergence will be discussed now. If c is 
a path in Em and Ac Em, c is said to converge to A provided 
lim gc(t;A) = O. The path c is said to enter A provided that given 
t+oo 
any T _::: 0, there is a time t > T such that c(t) E A. 
The next proposition is that an x(t) satisfying (6.1) and 
(6.2) will converge to K if K f r/J or will enter L if K = r/J, provided
that preferences are Euclidean. Hence in this case the path converges 
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to t he set KU 1 that was argued to have solution properties 
in the previous section. From corollary 5.1 we see that x(t) will 
move into one Pareto set P(M) after another, never leaving any after 
entering, as long as x(t) E J. So what occurs is that x(t) keeps 
moving simultaneously towards all winning coalitions' Pareto sets 
that do not contain it until it has either moved into them all (x E K) 
or can no longer approach them all simultaneously (x E L). 
Proposition 6.1: Suppose all preferences are Euclidean. If K # 0, 
t hen an x(t) satisfying (6.1) and (6.2) converges to K, and does so 
monotonically .if the game is strong. If K = 0, then x(t) enters L. 
Proof: Suppose first that K # 0. Then proposition 3.1 implies J = Em, 
so that so that x(t) E J always. Let M E W. Corollary 5.1 now implies that 
g/t;P(M)) is s.trictly decreasing in t when x(t) i P(M). As 
gx(t;P(M)) is bounded below by 0, 
(6. 3) d* = lim g (t;P(M)) 
t->= x 
exists. It was shown in proving corollary 5.1 that g
x
(t;P(M)) was 
differentiable when x(t) was differentiable, which is almost every-
where. Hence (6.3) implies 
(6.4) lim g�(t;P(M)) = 0 .
t-><x> 
Since x(t) is always approaching the compact set P(M), the range of 
the path x is contained in a compact set. As the range of x� is also 
contained in a compact set, there is a sequence t
v 
+ oo as v + oo 
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such that x lim x(t
v
) and x> 
v-><x> 
lim x>(t ) exist. Let z(t) E P(M) 
v->-00 v 
satisfy 
JI z(t) - x(t) II = g (t ;P(M)), x 
and let z = lim z(t ) .  Then 
v->-00 
v 
(6.5) · -x> • (Z- - x) -lim·g (t ;z(t )) g>(t ;z(t ))
v->-00 x v v x v v 
-lim g (t ;P(M)) g>(t ;P(M)) 
v->-00 x v x v 
(by 5.10)) 
-d*O = 0 (by (6.3) and 6.4)), 
Since Fis uppersemicontinuous, x> E F(x). If d* # 0 ,  then x ¢ P(M)
and so xi K. Hence by (6.1) and (6.2), 
(6.6) -x� 
rxn E K(x). 
IJx>ll > s > 0 and 
Let c(t) be a path such that c(t)= x and c>(t) = x>. Then, as 
w; - x-11 = g (t;P(M)), (6.6), corollary 5.1, and g (t);P(M)) > 0 c c 
imply t he contradiction 
-x> • cz- - x) -gc(t;z) g�(t;-z) 
- g (t;P(M)) g>(t;P(M)) c c 
> 0. 
(by (5.10)) 
This proves that d* = O. Hence x(t) converges to P(M) for each M EW, 
which means that x(t) converges to K n P(M). 
MEW 
If K # 0 and the game is strong, proposition 3.2 implies that 
x>(t) always "points" at K. This can be used to show g>(t;K) < 0 
when x(t) i K, so that x(t) monotonically converges to K. 
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Now suppose K = (3. If there was a T such that x(t) £ J 
for all t 2:_ T, the above argument establishes the existence of a 
limit point ;- such that;-£ P(M) for all Ms W. But then x £ K, 
which is impossible. Hence L exists and x(t) enters L when K = (3. 
The proof of proposition 6.1 could have used more of the 
special structure of Euclidean preferences, that is, it could have 
first been shown via proposition 4.1 that undorninated directions 
"point" towards all winning coalitions' Pareto sets, which indicates 
that x(t) must converge to them all if x(t) s J always. However,
the above proof used the Euclidean assumption only via the mono­
tinicity property. of corollary 5 .1. This should allow some elements 
of the proof .to be useful in proving convergence to K U L under a 
less restrictive preference assumption. 
7. THE EXISTENCE PROBLEM 
The value of the hypothesis that game outcomes will be
undominated is its use as a predictor. In situations where social 
change is slow, so that the status quo can never shift far, it
can be predicted to shift in undominated directions - provided they 
exist. But unfortunately, directional cores, like other cores, 
frequently don't exist.· 
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When the dimension m of the space is large relative to 
the number of people n, the problem is severe. Specifically, when 
W consists of coalitions of size q < n or larger, and m _:::max {2q - 1, 
q + l}, then Schofield [1977a] shows that for almost all n-tuples of
utility functions, the set of points satisfying his Null Dual condition 
is dense in E
m. Since it was shown in section 4 that a point satis­
fying his Null Dual condition has a null directional core, it must be 
that "usually" in these games L = Em and J = 0. Not only does this 
make the convergence result of section 6 trivially true, but it makes 
the existence of undominated directions so rare it seems useless to 
study them. 
However, often the number of individuals 
in the game is far larger than the dimensionality of the space, 
such as when the amounts of a few public goods must be decided upon 
in a large society. In these cases J is often sizeable, as the 
examples in figures 2.la-c illustrate. Nevertheless, proposition 2.1 
implies that a necessary condition for K(x) # 0 in the case of 
majority rule is that at least half the utility gradients lie on any 
closed side of any hyperplane containing x and x + v, where v £ K(x) . 
This condition of symmetry about the line determined by x and x + v 
is only slightly less restrictive, if m > 2, than Plott's [1967) 
symmetry condition about the point x necessary for x £ K. 
In fact, if there is a fraction A such that 
W = {M C N I An .5. I MI } , 
then the set of utility gradients satisfies a pairwise symmetry 
condition if v E K(x). Observe from proposition 2.1 that 
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v 2 K(x) if and only if x would be in the point core K if the only 
feasible directions in which x could shift were in 
D = {v 2 B I v•v .:".. O}. 
The conditions for x E K when the set of feasible shift directions is 
Dis one of the special cases considered in Matthews [1977], and, if
A = .5 and n is odd, the constrained majority rule case considered by
Plott [1967].
To apply Matthews [1977], let T be a two dimensional sub-
space of Em containing v 2 K(x), and let NT = {i 2 N I Vui(x) 2 T}. 
Let Q CNT be a maximal subset of NT that can be partitioned into 
pairs {i , j} for which nei ther Vu. (x) nor Vu. (x) is a multiple of
l J 
v, but there is an a. > 0 and a. > 0 such that
l J 
(7 .1) a. Vu.(x) + a . vu .(x) E {O,v}.l l J J 
Finally, let RC N�Q be defined by R {i EN I Vu.(x) = av forl 
some a > O}. Then a result in Matthews [1977] implies that a 
necessary condition for v E K(x) is a bound on !QI:
(7.2) INTI - [RI _.'.'.'. IQ[ > INTI - 2[RI - (ZA - l)n. 
To in�erpret this, suppose the game is majority rule with 
n odd. Then A = .5 and we have 
(7.3) INTI - IRI _.'.'.'.!QI > INTI- ZIRI.
If IR I = 0, then Q = NT so that NT is even, which cannot be true ;for 
all two dimensional subspaces T because n is odd. Hence (7. 3) implies 
!RI_.'.'.'. 1. If !RI = l, then (7.3) implies [QI = INTI - 1. In this 
case, by applying (7.3) to all two dimensional subspaces containing 
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v, we see that the n-1 people in N\R can be partioned into pairs 
whose gradients satisfy (7.1). This is exactly the condition 
obtained by Plott [1967] for constrained majority rule, and is 
obviously a restrictive symmetry condition. 
Thus we are left with the observation that directional 
cores, like the cores to most voting games, are often empty. 
The properties of paths generated by simple games that havi2 been 
established should still be useful in situations where directional 
cores usually exist. But a different dynamic hypothesis, not 
based in any way on an equilibrium or core solution concept, 
must be formulated to investigate situations where directional 
cores are empty. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix t o  s ect ion 2 first  invest igates the
relationship between K(x) and a directional core K ( x) defined by a 
mor e  complete inducement o f  preferences upon B than is represented
by P . (x) . I t  concludes with a proof that I is closed . l 
The best way to induce preferences from Em to B that is
in keep ing with the spirit  o f  the  model is to  define a preference 
ordering Pi ( x) on B by
A 
(A. l) v1Pi ( x) v2 # 3 1°  > 0 .3 ui ( x  + Av1)  > ui (x + Av2 ) 'r/ O  < A
< A .  Player :l will prefer shi f t ing x in direc tion v1 to shiftir:g it in
direct ion v2 , when both shi f t s  are very small and of equal  magni-
" A 
tude , if v1Pi (x) v2 • ·  As ui is cont inuously different iabl e ,  -v1Pi (x) v2 
and -v2Pi (x) v1 imply ui (x + Av1) = ui (x + Av2) for all A >  0 less than 
s ome A > O .  Thus an indi ff erence relation defined from Pi (x) truly
indicates that a player is indifferent between small shif ts . This 
is not true of an indifference relation de f ined from Pi ( x) , since
there are cases where v1Pi (x) v2 but not v1Pi (x) v2 . 
A 
The ordering P . (x) is a l inear approximat ion to P . (x) and l l 
A 
is s een in lemma Al below t o  b e  contained in P ., (x) . The condition 
l 
for Pi (x) = P . (x) on B = B '\..{ O }  is that u .  be locally symmetric l l 
( about its grad ient ) at x ,  which is defined to mean that for any 
v1 ,  v2 £ B ,  there exists  I > 0 such that
(A. 2) (v1 - v2 ) • Vui (x) :::_ 0 ==} ui (x + Xv1) _:: ui ( x + Av2 )
for all 0 < A < A .  The name o f  this property result s from the fact 
that (A. 2 )  i s  satisfied provided that whenever v1 , v2 £ B are equi-
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dis tant from the gradient Vui
(x) , Av1 and Av2 must b e  on the same
ind i fference curve for small A > 0 .  Euclidean funct ions as 
defined in ( 2 . 8) and linear functions are two examples of functions
everywhere locally symme t r i c . 
Lemma Al : P . (x ) c P .  (x) . P .  (x)l l l 
ui i s  locally symmetric at x .
A 
Pi (x) on B if and only if
Proo f :  I f  v1Pi (x)v2 , then (v1 - v2 )  • Vui
(x)  > 0 .  Let f ( A) 
ui ( x  + Av1) - ui ( x  + Av2 ) , and - observe that
lim
A->-0+ 
f ( A )  
-A- f � ( O )  = (v1 - v2)  • Vui (x)  > O .
Hence for  small A >  0 ,  f ( A ) > 0 , that is , v1Pi (x) v2 . 
n 
Now suppos e that Pi ( x) = Pi (x)  and that ( v1 - v2 ) • 
Vu
i
(x)  ::_ 0 f or a particular v1 , v2 £ B .  Then not v1Pi (x)v2 , and
A 
hence not v1Pi (x) v2 . Thus there is no I >  0 such that f ( A )  > 
0 
for all 0 < A < I. Since f is continuous ly differentiable , this 
imp lies the exis tence of A > 0 such that f (A) 2 0 for all 
0 < A  < I. This proves that ui is locally symmetric at x .
Conve rs ely , suppose ui i s  locally symmetric a t  x ,  and that
v1P
i (x) v2 . Then f (A )  > 0 for all small A >  O .  I f  (v1-v2 ) • Vui (x)
<: 0 , then by (A. 2) , there exists A > 0 such that f (X)  ::; 0 for all 0 
< A <  I. As this is impossible , (v1 - v2 ) · Vui (x) > 0 ,  implying
vlr i ( :r.) v2 .  
I f  v1 , v2 £ B ,  s ay that v1 (P (x) ) P (x)-domina tes v2 provided
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M £ W exists such that  v1Pi (x) v2 (v1Pi ( x) v2) for all i £ M .  Then
K(x) is the set  of P (x)-undominated direct ions , and s imilarly define 
the core K ( x) to be the set  o f  P ( x) -undominated d irections . K ( x) 
is a linear approximation to K ( x) , and the following propos i t ion 
specifies their relat ionship . Without further as sump t ions it  implies 
that the propos it ions of  this paper charact er i z ing direct ions in K (x) 
are also true for direct ions in K (x) . 
A " 
Proposit ion Al : K (x) c K (x) . Conversely , K(x)  = K (x) provid ed 
either ( i) every ui is linear , or ( ii)  every ui is locally
symmetric at x and , for each M £ W, x ¢ P (M) or
x £ interior { y  I ].  z 3 u . ( z )  > u . (y) V i £ M} :: IP (M) . 10
1 1 
Proo f : Lenuna Al implies K (x) c K (x) . If each u .  is linear , then --- 1 
P . (x )  = Pi (x)  => 
K (x) = K (x) . Now suppose each u .  is locally 
1 1 
symmetric at x ,  and let v £ K (x) . Case 1 :  v f 0 .  I f  v ¢ K (x) , 
then 3 M £ W � 0 P .  (x)v V i £ M ,  as by lemma Al ]. v -I 0 that1 
P (x) -dominat e s v. We know x £ P(M) , for otherwise
3 v /. 0 3 v Pi (x)  O V i £ M ,  which by lenuna Al and transitivity
implies th e contrad ict ion vP i (x)v V i £ M. Also , 0 P . (x) v 1 
implies 3 X > 0 3 V O <  A <  X, ui (x)  > u i (x + Av) V i £ M. " 
Hence x ¢ IP (M) . This final contrad ict ion proves v £ K(x) . 
Case 2 :  v = O .  Then b y  ( 3 . 1 ) , x £ P (M) V M £ W ,  s o  that
" 
x £ IP (M) V M E W .  But then no v E B P (x) - dominat es  v = 0 ,  
so that v £ K(x) . 
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Proposition A2 : I is closed . 
P roof :  Le t {xt } be a sequence  o f  points in I converging to x .  Let
v £ K ( x  ) .  S ince B is compact we can choos e  a subs equence {vk } oft t 
{vt } s uch that lim vk = v £ B .  We show that v £ K (x) and hence x £ I .  
If  v = O ,  then a s  0 £ B i s  an isolated point o f  B ,  there
exist  k0 such that vk = 0 for all k ..'."._ k0 • Suppose i £ M(x, v) for s ome
v £ B .  Then v • Vu . (x) > 0 .  As Vu . is cont inuous , there exis ts
1 1 
k ( i )  such that v • Vui (xk) > 0 for all k ..'."._ k ( i ) . Hence M(x, v) c M(� , v)
for all k > k m_!!X {k0 , k ( i )·} .  Since vk = O £ K (� ) for k _:'.. k ,i EM( x , v) 
proposition 2 . 1  implies M ( � , v) ¢ W for k _:'.. k .  Superadditivity now
imp lies M(x , v) ¢ W, , and proposition 2 . 1  now implies v £ K (x) . 
So as sume v -1 0 ,  and suppose v • v � 0 for some v £ B .  As
in the proof of proposit ion 2 . 1 , the finitenes s o f  N can be used to show
exis tence o f  a y £ B near v such that y • v < 0 and M(x, v) C M (x, y) . 
As in the p revious paragraph , the continuity of V�i implies the
exi s t ence of  k such that M(x , y ) C: M ( � , y) for all k � k .  Fur thermore , 
" 
since vk -+ v ,  there exis ts k such that y • vk < 0 for all k 2_ k .• 
I f  M(x , v) £ W ,  then M( � , y )  £ W for all k _.'.: max UC,�} ,  which implies
" 
vk t K (�) f or k _.'.: max {k , k }  by proposit ion 2 . 1 .  This contradic tion 
shows M(-;; , v) ¢ W for any v such that v • v � 0 .  Prop9,sit:i,on. 2. l.,. now
implies v £ K ( x) . 
APPENDIX B 
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The purpose of  this appendix is analagous to  that of 
appendix A, namely , to examine the relat ionship between the local
point core K and a truly local point core K defined here .
Just as  K (x) was viewed as a l inear approximation to K(x) , K will
be cons idered to  linear ly approximate K. 
Say that x £ Em is locally undominated provided a neighbor-
hood u of x exis ts such that for any z £ u ,  {i £ N I ui ( z )  > ui (x) } ¢ w .
The lo cal point core K is the s et of lo cally undominated po ints  in 
. Em. Say that a funct ion ui is locally pseudoconcave at � provided
there exists  a radius A i  > 0 such that for any v £ B ,
(B . l) v · · Vu . (x) < 0 ____;,.,,, u . ( x  + A v) < u .  (x) l. - --,- l.  - i  
for all 0 < A  < Ai . (Obs erve that local pseudoconcavity is equiva­
lent  to p seudoconcavity °( s ee  (5 . 1) )  if A .  = 00 . ) l. 
The following lemma , stron,ger than necessary for propo- · 
si tion Bl , · is o f  independent interes t  because it shows when K can 
be  defined in terms o f  K(x) j us t  as K is defined in (3 . 2) in terms
of K (x) . 
Lemma B l :  
(B . 2 )  . K c {x  £ Em I 0 £ K( x) } .
If  each u .  is lo cally pseudoconcave at each x contained in the right  l. • 
hand s ide o f  (B . 2 ) , then 
(B . 3) � = {x E Em I 0 £ K (x) } .
Proo f :  Suppose x £ ·K . I f  0 i K(x) , then there exis ts  M E W  and 
v £ B such that for each i £ M, vPi (x) O .  Hence for each i £ M, there
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is a "X. > 0 such that u . (x + Av) > u . ( x) for all 0 < A  < A  . .  As M is
l. l. l. l. 
finite ,  ).° min {X . } > 0 and for all i E M, u . (x + AV) > u . (x) if
i� l. l. l. 
0 < A  < "X. But now any neighborhood of x contains a point x + AV 
that dominates x via M ,  which contradicts x £ K .  Hence 0 £ K(x) .
Conversely ,  suppose  0 £ K (x) and each ui is locally ps eudo- ·
concave at x with a radius o f  A .  > 0.
l. 
As N is finite , I =  min { A . }  > o.
i£N i 
If x i  K, there exists  v £ B and A >  0 such that A < I  and
ui (x  + Av) > ui (x) for i contained in some M £ W, Hence by ( B . l ) ,
v • Vui (x) > 0 for all i £ M ,  i . e . , vPi (x) O for all i £ M .  By lemma
A 
Al , vPi (x) O for all i E M ,  which contradicts 0 £ K (x) . Hence x £ K .
Proposition B l : K c K .  If  each ui i s  locally pseudoconcave at
each x £ K, then � = K .6
Proof : Suppose x £ K .  Then 0 £ K (x) by lemma Bl , and by propos i-
t ion Al , 0 £ K(x) . Hence by (3 . 2 ) , x £ K .  Conversely , suppose  x £ K
and each ui is locally pseudoconcave at x .  
Let ).° =  min { A . }  > 0 ,
i£N i 
and let U = {x + AV I v £ B ,  0 _::: K < A } . I f  for some x + Av £ U ,
M = { i  E N I u .  (x + A'\)  > u . (x) }  £ W ,  then local pseudoconcavityl. l. 
and superadditivity imply M C  M(x , v) £ W .  This contradiction to  
x £ K shows x i s  locally undominated in  U ,  so that x E K.  
3 7  
Thus propositions true f o r  elemen t s  o f  K a r e  t r u e  f o r  elements 
of K ,  and local ps eudoconcavity is s uff i cient f o r  the converse.
Propos ition B2: K is closed . 
Proof: Let {x } be a s equence in K converging to x .  Let v t. . t 
Now apply the first half of the proof of proposition A2 . 
0 E K (xt ) .
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APPENDIX C 
In this app endix F(x) , defined in ( 6 . 2 ) , is shown to be 
upp ers emicontinuous . To do this, s uppose { �} and {yJ are two 
m - . -s equences in E s uch that � + x, yk E F(�) ,  and yk + y. Then
y E F (;;:) must be shown.
If x E K U  L ,  the p roof is trivial becaus e each l ! Yk l l  :5._ S 
implies that 1 1-Y l l :5._ S ,  which shows by ( 6 . 2 ) that y E F (x) . So 
s uppos e x E J\K .  
Becaus e  J\K is a n  open s et, xk E J\K for large k. Hence 
v = 
yk 
k 
--
l l Yk l l 
is contained in K (�) for large k, by (6 . 2 ) .  Insp ection
of the firs t p aragraph of the . proof to prop os ition A2 now 
reveals that it proves v s  K (x) , where vk + v = ff · Since 
s :5._ l lY- 1 1  :5._ S because s :5._ l ! Yk l l  :5._ S for large k, this shows that
Y E F(x) . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Median- like synune try condit ions are d i s c u s s ed ,  for example , in
Davis , DeGroot and Hinich [ 1 9 7 2 ] ,  S loss [ 1 97 3 ] , Hoyer and Mayer 
[ 19 75 ] ,  and Calvert [ 1 9 7 7 ) .  The more explicit pairwise symmetry 
conditions necessary in maj ority rule are discussed in Plo t t  [ 1 967 ) ,  
McKelvey and Wendell [ 1 9 7 5 ] ,  Mat thews [ 1 9 7 7 ] ,  and S lutsky [ 1 9 7 7 ] .  
2 .  See  Matthews [ 19 7 6 )  for a variety of  o ther interpretations of  a 
s imilar model applied to the special cas e of electoral competition . 
3. Notice that this does not s ay that c � ( t )  E K ( c ( t ) ) .  Hence it is
not  necess arily true that a s tatus quo  moving along c i s  shifting 
in undominated direct ions . This kind of  path is  discussed  later . 
4 .  Notice that ( 4 . 5 i ii)  �mplies Jl c � ( t )  I I = 1 .  Hence the local
cycling property imp lies the existence of a nondegenerate
path from x to  x that s tays near x ,  which• accounts for the
name " local cycling . "  
5 .  See S chofield [ 1 9 7 7b ] for a very different argument for con-
sidering L as a solution set .
6 .  When N is no t finite ,  nei ther K C  K or K C: K  is true in general ,
even assuming local pseudoconcavi ty . Pseudoconcavity , however , 
implies both K c  K and K •c= {globally undomiI],ated points } .  See
Calvliir t  [ 19 77 ] and Sloss [ 1 9 7 3 ]  for further discussion of  K and K 
when N i s  arbitrarily large . 
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